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In  this  paper  we  assess,  through  a  financial  measure  (Net  Present  Value 
Ratio),  the  extent  of  the  lifetime  earning  redistribution  operated  by  the 
Notional Defined Contribution in a sample of individuals representative of 
the Italian population born from 1975 to 2000. Controlling mortality by the 
level of education we identify at least three channels of redistribution: among 
genders (from men to women), along educational lines (from low to high 
educated)  and  among  income  quintiles  (from  poor  to  rich).  This  happens 
because  some  groups  systematically  live  less  than  average  (men,  low-
educated  and  poor)  while  others  live  more  than  average  (women,  high 
educated and rich). This finding is not trivial: even if the NDC system assure 
long term financial sustainability, it harms the most disadvantaged groups 
like poor and low-educated people. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The  1995  reform  of  the  Italian  Social  Security  System  introduced  a 
notional  defined  contribution  (NDC)  system  that  will  have  important 
consequences both under the macroeconomic point of view, ensuring in the 
long run the system financial sustainability, and under the microeconomic 
point  of  view,  affecting  future  both  retirees’  income  distribution  and 
individual’s retirement decisions. 
In  the  economic  literature  the  NDC  system  is  considered  to  be 
“actuarially  fair”  (or,  fairer  than  a  defined  benefit  one)  [Castellino  and 
Fornero 2001]: it should equalize, for each individual, the present value of 
benefits  (PVB)  to  the  present  value  of  contributions  (PVC).  Once  an 
individual  reaches  the  retirement  age,  his/her  cumulated  contributions are 
converted into a stream of monthly benefits according to a conversion factor: 
under  the  Italian  law  (L.  335/95)  this  factor  called  “coefficiente  di 
trasformazione” (common for both sexes and forecasted to change every ten 
years in order to compensate expected increase in life expectancies) takes 
into account the average life expectancy at retirement age. However, since 
the PVB depends on the actual life length at retirement, actuarial fairness, 
among individuals that belong to a certain generation, will occur only for 
those who happen to live as long as the average individual does. For the 
others, the system is “unfair”: the pensioners who die earlier then the mean 
will incur in a “waste” of resources, while those who die later will have a 
“gain”
1.  
Since life expectancy is affected by socio-economic determinants, like 
level  of  education,  sex  and  occupational  status,  there  are  groups  of 
individuals whose life expectancy is higher or lower than the mean. In a 
certain  sense  this  should  not  be  a  surprise  since  the  inherently  insurance 
characteristics of the NDC system. However there might be systematic, even 
if unintended, redistribution of lifetime resources among different groups of 
                                                 
1 Among losers, one has also to consider all individuals that paying contributions to the 
pension system occur to die before the age of retirement.   2 
the population if life expectancy at retirement and lifetime income ranking 
happens to be positively correlated. 
The  aim  of  this  article  is  to  assess,  through  a  financial  measure,  the 
extent of this phenomenon in a sample of individuals representative of the 
Italian population born from 1975 to 2000, whose pension benefit will be 
computed under the new regime (NDC) introduced in 1995. We will use 
CAPP_DYN, a dynamic microsimulation model developed at CAPP (Centro 
di  Analisi  delle  Politiche  Pubbliche  –  Center  for  the  Public  Policies 
Analysis): this model allows scholars to study the long-term redistributive 
effects of the pension system and its reforms (Ministero del lavoro e della 
previdenza sociale 2005, Ministero della solidarietà sociale 2008). Actuarial 
fairness  will  be  evaluated  applying  a  new  demographic  module  which 
explicitly takes into account the estimated differences in mortality due to 
educational attainment. 
A first contribution of the paper is the building of differential mortality 
tables for Italy.  
Secondly in order to assess the redistribution of lifetime resources within 
the NDC system in the presence of differential mortality we compute the Net 
Present Value Ratio (NPVR), defined as the ratio between the PVB and the 
PVC for each individual of the sample. 
Controlling for educational level and for quintiles of Average Indexed 
Yearly  Income  we  find  that  the  NDC  system  determines  a  substantial 
regressive redistribution of lifetime resources within each cohort and sex. 
These results pose a problem under the economic policy point of view, since 
the NDC system ends up transferring money from poor and low educated 
people to rich and high educated ones: a result that contradicts not only the 
progressivity of the system but also its claimed neutrality.   
 
 
2.  Education and Differential Mortality 
 
Mortality  can  be  differentiated  provided  many  socio-economic 
indicators, such as income, wealth, education, professional status: we adopt   3 
education  as  our  preferred  indicator.  That  is  because  education  is  not 
correlated  with  health,  so  it  is  not  affected  by  simultaneity  problems 
(unlikely income: an individual can have higher mortality risk because of his 
poverty,  but  he  can  be  poor  because  already  in  a  bad  health  status). 
Moreover, since education and life-cycle income are positively correlated, 
educational  level  can  be  also  interpreted  as  a  proxy  of  the  individual’s 
lifetime resources. Additionally, unlikely professional status (blue or white 
collars, for example), education enables to study even individuals outside the 
job market. Under this point of view, educational level would have a mediate 
and indirect effect on mortality, due to the correlated variables like income 
and  wealth.  On  the  other  hand,  qualification  synthesizes  the  human  and 
cultural  capital  owned  by  individuals:  “virtuous”  behaviours  (such  as 
foresight,  patience  in  delaying  satisfaction,  awareness  of  some  dangerous 
habits like smoking) are more likely associated with high school attainments. 
These are direct effects, which must be considered with the indirect ones. 
Empirically, there is large evidence that life expectancy is increasing in 
educational levels. 
Coding schooling years in four classes (less than 7; 8;  9 to 12; more than 
13), among those aged 65-74 mortality rate
2 is 4,23% for an American man 
in the bottom educational class, and 2,69% for the top class, while women’s 
figures are respectively 2,36% and 1,45% [Preston and Elo 1995].  
Brown [2002], after having computed ad hoc group-specific mortality 
tables,  finds  that  the  life  expectancy  at  age  22  is  80,5  years  for  a  white 
graduated man and 75,5 years for a white man with less than High School 
education. The same patterns are found even within the others racial groups: 
so the difference in life expectancy amounts to 3 years between the most and 
least  educated  white  females,  6,5  years  within  black  men  and  4,5  years 
within black women. 
                                                 




= × , where m is the rate, n is the 
number of events (in our case, deaths), K is a proportionality factor e p is the benchmark 
population.    4 
It is a well-known point that in Italy there is not any national longitudinal 
survey on differential mortality across socioeconomic groups
3. However, on 
2002,  the  Italian  National  Institute  of  Statistics  (ISTAT)  published  the 
second edition of a transversal study [ISTAT 2001]. This survey uses 1981 
and  1991  census  data  and  (although  it  does  not  provide  differentiated 
mortality tables), estimates crude and standardised mortality rates depending 
on  classes  of  age
4.  Taking  a  glance,  the  ISTAT  study  finds  mortality 
differential for educational level to be very strong in Northern Italy and in 
the  first  class  of  age  (18-59):  let  100  be  the  average  standardised  rate, 
regardless  of  education,  un  illiterate  man  faces  a  rate  of  188,  while  a 
graduate coetaneous only 47. For younger northern men, mortality rates at 
the bottom of educational level are four times as much as those at the top 
[ISTAT 2001, pp. 17 e ss.].  
Giving a broader description, men’s relationship between education and 
mortality is “regular”: it favours degree or high school diploma holders (172 
for  illiterates,  102  per  lower  secondary  school,  52  for  graduates;  elderly 
people show an analogous trend, with a smaller extent). The phenomenon 
among women is slightly different: gaps are far smaller (for example, the 
difference  between  degree  and  secondary  school  is  very  little  for  the 
younger, and negligible for the elderly)
5.  
A  first  attempt  to  analyse  life  expectancy  at  certain  age  by  level  of 
education  has  recently  been  made  by  Maccheroni  [2008].  He  uses  death 
certificate and census data as sources of information, and adopts econometric 
                                                 
3There are only local longitudinal enquires, covering determined areas like Turin, Tuscany 
or Reggio-Emilia. 
4 Crude rates are calculated dividing deaths occurred in a class of age by the relative stock of 
population. However, it could be tricky to make comparisons among different countries or 
group, because of (possible) different demographic structure of the population. For example, 
if a population is older than another one, it will show higher mortality rates, partly due to the 
different demographic structure and partly to the actual conditions of life. In order to avoid 
this bias, standardised rates are used: they say what the mortality rates would have been if 
the  population’s  age  distribution  was  equal  to  a  standard  population’s  distribution, 
previously defined. Standardised rates allow comparisons across space and along time. 
5 The most accepted explanation calls the differences in the major causes of death in the two 
genders.  Men’s  most  common  fatal  disease,  lung  cancer,  is  negatively  correlated  with 
education,  while  women’s one, breast tumour,  is positively associated  with educational 
level  (probably  because  of  the  “renounce”  to  some  protective  factors,  such  as  early 
pregnancy and breast-feeding [Candela S. et al. 2005]). 
   5 
techniques to obtain differentiated mortality tables. Maccheroni finds that 
difference in life expectancy  at 35  years between high and low  educated 
people is 7,6 years among men and 6,5 among women, while at 65 years 
these values are respectively 5,5 and 5,3 years. According to Maccheroni, 
men’s figures are consistent with those shown by the international literature, 
while differential mortality among Italian women appears to be higher than 
that previously supposed [ISTAT 2001; Candela S. et al. 2005]. 
 
 
3.  Mortality, Progressivity and Redistribution 
 
The  most  used  measure  to  judge  the  intergenerational  redistribution 
operated by a pension system is the Net Present Value Ratio (NPVR) defined 
as the ratio of the present value of benefits received to the present value of 
contributions  paid  during  lifetime,  each  evaluated  at  retirement  age.  The 
denominator of this indicator can be seen as the premium an individual pays 
to purchase an annuity which lasts as long as the individual lives (Brown 



















   
 
where P,t is the pension benefit at time t, Si,t represents the probability of 
living to period t, T is the maximum life span and r is the real discount rate. 
The  interpretation  of  (1.1)  is  straightforward:  if  NPVR  equals  to  1,  in 
actuarial  terms,  the  individual  receives  the  same  amount  of  money  that 
he/she has paid as social security contributions. If NPVR is higher (smaller) 
than 1, the individual faces an expected gain (loss). Another way to look at 
this measure is to interpret it as the return of each present value euro paid 
(i.e., if NPVR equals to 0,91, it means that the individual will receive 91 
cents back each euro he/she has contributed for).    6 
The relation between differential mortality and returns form the Social 
Security system has been studied above all in the U.S. The public pillar of 
the U.S. pension system is formally progressive: it combines a flat payroll 
tax  with  a  benefit  formula  which  replaces  a  higher  share  of  earnings  for 
workers with low lifetime earnings. However, part of this progressivity can 
be offset by differential mortality: once the latter is taken into account, is the 
system still progressive? 
   Liebman  [2002]  analyses  the  cohort  born  from  1925  to  1929  and 
estimates the internal rate
6 of return by sex, race and education. Main results 
of this work are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Impact of differential mortality on Internal Rate of Return,  
by race and education. USA. 
 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (%) 
  Including mortality 
 due to 
race and education 
Omitting mortality  
due to 
race and education 
White  1,52  1,59 




1,63  1,88 
High School  1,46  1,52 
More than 
High School 
1,46  1,35 
 
Source: Liebman [2002]. 
 
With  respect  to  the  case  of  uniform  mortality  (second  column),  the 
introduction of differential mortality have significant effects on IRT of those 
people  with  higher  mortality  rates,  such  as  blacks  and  low-educated 
                                                 
6 The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is defined as the rate that makes the present value of 
benefits  equal  to  present  value  of  contributions.  IRR  and  NPVR  provide  the  same 
information, since the IRR is the value of r that makes the NPVR in (1.1) equal to 1.   7 
individuals. The former receive an IRT of 1,64% (it would have been 2,19% 
if differential mortality had not had effects), the latter have a return of 1,63% 
(instead of 1,88%). High-educated people are the only “winners” by means 
of differentiated mortality: their IRT increases from 1,35 to 1,46%. Liebman 
classifies  individuals  by  Average  Indexed  Monthly  Income,  defined  as 
lifetime earnings divided by the number of years with positive earnings, as 
well:  he  finds  that  top  and  bottom  quintiles  receive  respectively  a  Net 
Present Value Ratio
7 of 0,86 and 1,41 with uniform mortality rates, while 
with  group-specific  mortality  these  figures  are  0,87  and  1,38.  Therefore, 
everything being equal, differential mortality ends up redistributing money 
from  low-income-education  people  to  those  with  both  high  income  and 
education. 
Brown [2002] focuses on the redistribution that occurs within a Notional 
Defined Contribution (NDC) system, very close to the Italian pension system 
introduced in 1995. Next table shows Brown’s findings with an interest rate 
of 3%. 
Table 2 
NPVR by sex, race and education. USA (computing pensions under the 
Notional Defined Contribution System). 
 
Population subgroups  Men  Women 
All  0,920  1,076 
Whites: All  0,927  1,084 
Less than High School  0,865  1,044 
High School  0,916  1,080 
Degree  0,967  1,106 
Blacks: All  0,862  1,022 
Less than High School  0,800  0,976 
High School  0,857  1,022 
Degree  0,916  1,055 
 
Source: Brown [2002]. 
  
                                                 
7 In order to sterilize inter-cohort transfers, Liebman uses the cohort’s internal rate of return 
(1,29%) as real interest rate to compute NPVR: see equation (1.1).    8 
The first thing to note is the large resource transfer from men to women: 
because of different mortality, for every dollar paid to purchase the annuity, 
a man expects to receive 92 cents and a woman can expect $1,076. Large 
gaps arise even within racial groups: there are 10 points difference between 
top and bottom educated among white males, 6 points for white females, 11 
and  8  points  among,  respectively,  black  males  and  females.  Concluding, 
black  men  with  less  than  High  Schools  are  the  largest  “losers” 
(NPVR=0,800),  while  white  graduated  women  are  the  largest  “winners” 
(NPVR=1,106).  
Outside U.S., Nelissen [1999] investigates Dutch case. Although Holland 
is  among  the  countries  with  lowest  differential  mortality  (along  with 
Sweden,  Denmark  and  Norway).  He  estimates  that  high-educated  people 
have  a  life  expectancy  at  birth  4,5  years  higher  than  low-educated  ones. 
Therefore, an individual with a low educational level, compared with the 
average individual, faces a loss of 6% in his permanent income (lifetime 
earnings and pension benefits). 
Turning  to  Italy,  Caselli  et  al.  [2003]  study  the  link  between  life 
expectancy and conversion factors at regional level. They compare legislated 
factors (which guarantee actuarial fairness on average) with those that would 
be  necessary  to  assure  actuarial  fairness  in  each  of  the  four  regions 
considered. 
A positive (negative) deviation means that estimated-regional factors are 
higher  (smaller)  than  legislated-national  ones:  it  follows  that  these 
individuals’ pensions should be higher (smaller) than the actual, in order to 
achieve  actuarial  fairness.  Therefore,  “loser”  regions  are  Campania  and 
Lombardy  (whose  estimated  conversion  factors  are  respectively  4%  and 
1,5% higher than legislated ones); Calabria roughly reflects Italian mortality, 
so its pensioners neither gain or lose with legislated factors; Tuscany shows 
negative deviation percentages that make its retirees the “winners” in the 
current pensions system. 
 
   9 
Table 3 
Legislated (Italy) and estimated (Regions) conversion factors. 
"Deviation" refers to the percentage difference between estimated and 
legislated. 
 
Region  60 years old  65 years old 
Italy   0,05163  0,06136 
Lombardy  0,05240  0,06222 
deviation  1,5%  1,4% 
Tuscany  0,05096  0,06037 
deviation  -1,3%  -1,6% 
Campania  0,05359  0,06394 
deviation  3,8%  4,2% 
Calabria  0,05154  0,0629 
deviation  -0,2%  -0,1% 
 
Source: Caselli et al. [2003]. 
   
 
4. The model 
 
All  the  simulations  presented  in  this  paper  are  performed  using 
CAPP_DYN (Mazzaferro and Morciano, 2008), a dynamic microsimulation 
model  of  the  Italian  population  developed  at  the  Centro  di  Analisi  delle 
Politiche Pubbliche (CAPP), a joint research centre for the analysis of public 
policies,  run  by  the  Universities  of  Modena  and  Bologna.  The  model 
simulates  the  main  characteristics  of  the  Italian  population  from  2005  to 
2050.  Fig.  1  shows  the  structure  of  the  model:  there  is  an  initial  base 
population, a second block which estimates past earnings of the currently 
active population, a simulation cycle which determines the future evolution 
of the population, and a final output where all annual cross–sectional data are 
aggregated into a single panel.    10 
 
Figure 1  
The structure of the CAPP_DYN model 
 
The initial population is taken from the 2002 wave of the Bank of Italy 
Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW_02), a dataset comprising 
8001  households  and  21,400  individuals,  which  has  been  resampled  and 
inflated. Any simulation randomly extracts a sample of 107,000 households 
and 270,000 individuals. 
While  the  unit  of  simulation  is  the  individual,  we  nevertheless  keep 
information on family structure and any changes this may be subjected to 
over  the  course  of  time.  All  individuals  in  the  sample  are  involved  in  a 
considerable number of demographic and economic events, such as birth, 
education, marriage, work, retirement and death. Economic and demographic 
transitions among states are simulated using Monte Carlo processes. A set of 
matrices  and  econometric  models  are  employed  to  generate  transition 
probabilities, so as to produce a lifetime pattern of education, work, career, 











AGGREGATION   11 
The CAPP_DYN model has a recursive structure consisting in a set of 
modules executed in a predetermined order. The structure of these modules 
is shown in Fig. 2. The simulation starts with a set of demographic modules 
(mortality, fertility, net migration, household structure, divorce). These are 
followed by a module for educational choices. The next module deals with 
job decisions and the estimation of earnings. Each individual may change 
occupational  status  (full  time,  part-time,  out  of  the  labour  market, 
unemployed) during his/her lifetime. Finally, each individual, on the basis of 
the  current  pension  laws,  of  his/her  accrued  seniority  and  of  the  legal 
retirement age, moves towards retirement. 
Individual income comes from employment or from the social security 
system.  For  employed  people,  an  earnings  equation  is  used  to  estimate 
lifetime  labour  income.  For  retired  individuals  we  compute  occupational, 
survival and social-flat rate benefits, taking into account the rather complex 
nature of the Italian pension system, as far as possible. 
With  respect  to  the  standard  version  of  the  model  the  novelty  of  the 
estimations  presented  in  this  paper  concerns  the  mortality  module.  The 
technical working of the mortality module is the following: as usual, given 
the  year  of  simulation,  age  and  gender,  a  random  number  drawn  from  a 
uniform  distribution  [0,1]  is  attached  to  each  observation.  If  the  random 
value is smaller than the age-cohort specific ISTAT death probability, then 
the  model  simulates  death  and  consequently  modifies  the  cohabitant’s 
marital status. However, using differentiated mortality tables that we will 
describe in the next subsection, we are able to apply a different pattern of the 
mortality to individuals with respectively a low a middle and a high level of 




-  Mortality 
-  Fertility 
-  Net Migration 
-  Children leaving home 
-  Marriage 
-  Separation 
Social Security 
 
-  Retirement decision 
-  Old Age Pension 
-  Survival  pension 
-  Disability pension 
-  Social Assistance Pension 
 
Model Population  
at time (t+1) 
 
Next year 
(t = t+1) 
Model Population 
at time t 
Education and labour 
 
-  Education (three levels) 
-  Transition to the labour market 
-  Occupational status (employed/unemployed/not 
involved in the labour market) 
-  Type of employment (employee/ self-employed) 
-  Income generation (earnings)  
5. Differential mortality 
 
Differential  mortality  tables  are  currently  not  available  in  Italy.  This 
subsection describe the procedure adopted to estimate them from available 
data. 
First, we compute group-specific crude mortality rates, using data from 
death  certificates  and  labours  surveys  and  controlling  for  sex  and  three 
different level of education; then, we estimate relative risks, dividing each 
group-specific mortality rate by the general mortality rate; finally, we obtain 
differentiated death probability multiplying our relative risks to the general 
age-related death probability. An important hypothesis has been introduced: 
mortality differentials, in relative terms, stay constant across all generations
8. 
Let  x q be  the  death  probability  of  a  man
9  aged  x ,  regardless  of  his 
education. We can write: 

















x RR  represents the group-specific relative risk (for instance, the 
70% more than average for an illiterate man, or the 30% less for a graduate) 
for the age x, and the apexes  ,  , e  a b g  refer respectively to an individual 
with low, middle and high education. 
The first step is to compute group specific mortality rates. Mortality rates 









= ×  
where n is the number of  deaths, p is the benchmark population, K is a 
proportionality  factor  (we  set  K=10.000),  x  refers  to  age  and  i  to  the 
                                                 
8 Roughly speaking, if a 40 years-old graduate man faces a death risk 30% less than average, 
this 30% difference will come out even for the 40 years-old born ten, twenty years later and 
so on. 
9 Women’s procedure is identical. We deal with men for sake of simplicity and to avoid the 
abuse of apexes and subscripts.    14 
educational level. The sources of data are the death certificates provided by 
ISTAT
10  (for  the  numerator  n)  and  the  Surveys  on  Labour
11  (for  the 
denominator p). Since the classes of education in these two sources do not 
perfectly  match,  we  have  re-aggregated  them  to  make  our  calculations 
consistent  with  the  CAPP_DYN  education  module  (Mazzaferro  and 
Morciano 2008).  
Each  individual,  in  the  model,  can  reach  three  different  levels  of 
education:  compulsory  education  (formally  achieved  at  16  years  old,  but 
actually many pupils drop out earlier), high school, and university degree. 
Therefore, we aggregate available data according to these three levels, as it 









Degree  High 
School 
Less than High School   
Death 
Certificates 
Degree  High  
School 
  Lower 
Secondary 
Primary  Unknown 















Table 4 summarizes our classification. Data regarding death certificates 
contain about 15% of individuals whose level of education is unknown: we 
decide not to impute them to other levels, and to subtract these observations 
from the total
13. 
We now have, for each sex, level of education and class of age (five-year 
classes from 15 to 74 years, and an open class from 75 onwards), the number 
of deaths and the respective stock of population. 
                                                 
10 ISTAT (2005), Decessi: caratteristiche demografiche e sociali. Anno 2001, Roma. 
11 Rilevazione Continua sulle Forze di Lavoro -  Media 2001. 
12 They usually last 3 years (instead of 5) and do not allow to enroll at University.  
13 For a discussion on how to treat unknown data, see Maccheroni [2008, pp. 3-6].   15 
Table 5 shows crude mortality rates computed in this way. 
 
Table 5 
Crude Mortality Rates (per 10.000 persons),  
by education and class of age.  
 



















15-19  4,99  6,70  0,00  5,14  1,96  2,29  0,00  2,00 
20-24  12,18  4,63  8,86  7,97  4,18  1,56  2,36  2,43 
25-29  12,23  4,45  3,64  8,17  3,89  1,79  1,54  2,66 
30-34  11,45  4,45  2,40  8,12  4,52  2,54  1,40  3,42 
35-39  14,26  6,10  3,60  10,73  6,17  4,21  2,28  5,13 
40-44  18,83  8,60  6,23  14,31  9,52  6,79  4,07  8,17 
45-49  29,39  13,99  12,03  23,10  14,72  10,01  8,00  12,96 
50-54  46,83  23,56  19,49  38,72  22,88  15,62  12,43  20,86 
55-59  75,23  40,60  31,88  65,66  34,37  20,28  18,92  31,83 
60-64  117,52  56,83  44,12  104,80  51,72  33,63  21,14  49,07 
65-69  194,14  98,61  85,23  179,91  86,94  51,07  37,12  83,38 
70-74  317,31  175,13  172,48  298,31  152,09  90,55  57,07  146,30 
75+  878,37  466,11  457,90  828,44  670,78  357,81  241,23  650,03 
Total  142,18  24,66  40,22  104,71  132,03  15,28  14,29  97,48 
 
Source: our calculation on ISTAT data.  
 
Important differences arise when we take into account schooling years. A 
graduated 60-to-64 years-old man has a rate of 44,12, and a man who did not 
get the High School diploma 117,52 (more than double the amount of the 
former). Similar pattern are observed among women. 
The second step is to derive relative risks, that is to say the RR terms in 
(1.2). For each gender and class of age, we divide the three group-specific 
mortality rates by the total population’s rate. We do not consider the class 
15-19, since no one can graduate by that age, and we ignore the open class 
75+, because it covers too many years. Finally, for years from 100 to 120,   16 
we impute relative risks of 1: we assume that at very old age educational 
levels do not matter anymore, death being unavoidable. This assumption is 
consistent with the empirical findings presented above. 
Relative risks we estimated are shown in table 6. 
 
Table 6  
Relative Risks by education and class of age. 
 
Men  Women  Class 









20-24  1,528  0,581  1,112  1,717  0,642  0,970 
25-29  1,497  0,545  0,446  1,461  0,671  0,578 
30-34  1,410  0,548  0,296  1,320  0,741  0,410 
35-39  1,329  0,569  0,335  1,203  0,821  0,445 
40-44  1,316  0,601  0,436  1,166  0,831  0,498 
45-49  1,272  0,605  0,521  1,136  0,772  0,617 
50-54  1,210  0,609  0,503  1,097  0,749  0,596 
55-59  1,146  0,618  0,486  1,080  0,637  0,594 
60-64  1,121  0,542  0,421  1,054  0,685  0,431 
65-69  1,079  0,548  0,474  1,043  0,613  0,445 
70-74  1,064  0,587  0,578  1,040  0,619  0,390 
100+  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000 
 
Source: our calculation on ISTAT data 
Note: Ratio of subgroup male (female) mortality to general population male (female) 
mortality.  Relative Risks of 1 are imputed for ages ranging from 100 to 120. 
 
 
Each cell in table 6 says the subgroup percentage deviation from total  
population of a given age class in its mortality rate. 
We  now  interpolate  our  data  in  order  to  obtain  annual  relative  risks. 
Graph 1 and Graph 2 show these figures for both sexes. 
   17 
Graph 1 





















20 40 60 80 100
eta



























































   18 
We see a decreasing trend of the solid line (less than High School): the 
relative disadvantage of these people is stronger during youth. The dashed 
(High School) and dotted line (degree) are stable around 50% until 74 years, 
then approach 1 because of our interpolation. The second thing to note is 
that, from about 70 years onwards, graduate individuals and High School 
holders share the similar patterns. The great difference is between those who 
have  studied  until  or  more  than  secondary  school,  and  those  who  have 
studied less.   
The third step is to compute differentiated death probability, applying 
(1.2). This procedure enable us to take into account even the cohort effect, 
since  x q  depends on birth year as well, and we have assumed that RR are 
equals  for  all  the  generations  considered.  Let’s  note  that  in  the  dynamic 
simulation  the  model  exploits  ISTAT  death  probability  official  forecasts 
(2005-2050). 
Final  step  is  purely  computational,  tough  very  important,  and  assures 
model’s consistency. The point is that, year by year, the number of deaths 
simulated  by  the  model  must  be  the  same  whether  differentiated  or  non-
differentiated rates apply. Otherwise, the differential mortality would imply a 
“deny” of the whole population’s rates, which must be still valid. Therefore, 
the model implements this algorithm: it simulates and counts the number of 
deaths with undifferentiated mortality, and compares the number of deaths 
after having applied the differentiated rates. The benchmark is, of course, the 
former,  and  the  latter  is  calibrated  to  match  the  benchmark.  The  model 
calculates the difference between the scenarios: if difference is positive, it 
means that differentiation has made not enough deaths; if it is negative, the 
experiment  has  made  too  many  deceased.  CAPP_DYN,  in  the  first  case, 
randomly  generates  further  deaths  among  the  survived;  in  the  second  it 
randomly makes the dead in excess “live again”. 
Based on the procedure described above, we compute on our estimated 
differential mortality tables the theoretical life expectancy at birth and at 65 
years old, by sex and education.  
   19 
Table 7 
Life expectancy at birth and at 65 years, by sex and education.  
Calendar year 2008. 
 
Life expectancy 
At birth  At 65   Education 
Men   Women  Men   Women 
Less than High School  76,5  83,5  16,9  21,5 
High School  82,0  86,6  20,4  23,9 
Degree  82,6  88,3  20,7  25,3 
Total  77,6  84,0  17,3  21,7 
 
Source: our estimation on Istat data. 
 
Life  expectancy
14  varies  greatly  between  and  within  genders. 
Irrespectively of education, life expectancy at birth is 77,6 years for men and 
84  for  women,  while  at  65  years  old  these  values  are  17,3  and  21,7. 
Considering education, a man can expect to live 76,5 years if he has a low 
level of education and 82,6 years if he gets a degree, with a difference of 6,1 
years. A woman without secondary education on average lives up 83,5 years 
that  rise  to  88,3  if  she  has  graduated,  with  a  difference  of  4,8  years. 
Obviously, gaps remain high even at 65 years old: between least and most 
educated there are 3,8 years of difference for both sexes. 
These data roughly confirm those of Maccheroni [2001], whose findings 
are here summarized above.  
 
 
6.  Main results 
 
In order to asses the effects of the introduction of differential mortality 
on the distribution of lifetime resources under the NDC system we run the 
                                                 







= , where  x e  is 
the life expectancy at age x,  x T are the person-years remaining for individuals of age x and 
x l is the number of survivors at age x.   20 
microsimulation model substituting the official mortality tables of  ISTAT 
with  those  estimated  as  described  in  the  former  subsection.  Our 
microsimulation involves all the individuals born from 1975 and 2000 who 
reach retirement age and whose pension will be computed under the new 
regime (NDC). This panel contains 13.857 individuals, 7.160 men and 6.697 
women.  All  findings  and  comments  that  follow  are  now  referred  to 
pensioners and not to general population. 
Table 8 shows average pensioners’ death age in the panel.   
 
Table 8 




Men   Women 
Less than High School  82,5  87,3 
High School  86,0  89,0 
Degree  85,9  90,0 




Results  confirm  figures  of  the  table  7:  life  expectancy  appears  to  be 
influenced both by sex and educational level. In particular a male pensioner 
born  from  1975  to  2000  with  less  than  High  School  expects  to  live  on 
average 3,4 less than a graduate, while for women this difference is 2,7. 
CAPP_DYN is based on a heterogeneous population so that we can focus 
not only on the average levels, but also on the whole distribution. 
 It can be useful to plot the frequencies of death age by educational level. 
Since the existence of differentiated mortality tables, we can expect that the 
proportion  of  individuals  died  at  very  old  age  is  higher  among  the  most 
educated ones.    21 
Graph 3 
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The graph shows that the low-educated frequency (solid line) is more left 
skewed and the high-educated frequency (dotted line) is more right skewed, 
meaning that the probabilities to survive after 85 years are higher among 
those with the highest levels of education. On the other side, percentage of 
individuals died before 85 years is higher among the least educated people. 
Again, dashed and dotted lines are very close, meaning that male graduated 
and High School holders have quite similar survival paths. 
We provide the analogous female graph: this time the relation between 
education and death age is even clearer. 
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Graph 4 
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Unlikely Graph 3, here there is a certain difference even between High 
School and degree. 
Moving  to  the  analysis  of  the  effects  of  differential  mortality  on  the 
distribution of lifetime resources under the NDC system, Graph 5 plots, for 
the whole panel, the relation between NPVR and death age. As expected the 
NPVR displays a positive relation with the age of  death. 
It is interesting to notice that NPVR reaches the value of 1 at the age of 
89, which is higher than the average life length. This can be explained by the 
fact  that  the  transformation  coefficients  (used  by  the  model  to  compute 
pension benefits) take into account the expected survival benefits, whereas 
our computations of NPVR do not
15.  
 
                                                 
15 At this stage, we decided not to consider the distributive effects of survival benefits which 
can occur between married and single individuals.    23 
Graph 5 


















The whole panel, irrespectively of sex and education, receives a NPVR 
of 0,935. This means that the generations born from 1975 to 2000 expect a 
loss of 6,5 cents for every euro paid as contribution. This finding confirms 
that  the  NDC  system  is  less  generous  than  the  previous  defined-benefits 
system, and that the transition generates a burden weighting on the future 
pensioners (present students and workers)
16.   
Since NPVR depends on life length (see Graph 5), and since life length is 
affected by educational level (as we have seen in Table 8), we can expect the 
NPVR to be different provided education and, obviously, sex. 
                                                 
16 These results are consistent with those reported by Fornero and Castellino [2001].   24 
Table 9 reports the main results of our simulation. 
 
Table 9 




Men   Women 
Less than High School  0,781  0,956 
High School  0,910  1,017 
Degree  0,904  1,040 




The first thing to note regards the difference between average male and 
female NPVR. While a man expects to receive only 86,6 cents for every euro 
paid, a woman gets back the same amount she has contributed for, since her 
NPVR is 1,001
17. 
Looking within genders, we also see large differences along educational 
lines. Men with less than High School do particularly poor, having a NPVR 
of 0,781, about 10% less than average male NPVR (0,866) and 16% less 
than whole panel’s NPVR (0,935). On the other hand, luckiest group are 
graduate women: they have a NPVR of 1,040, about 4% more than average 
female NPVR (1,001) and 12% more than general NPVR (0,935).  
We can identify two channels of redistribution: between genders (from 
man to women), and within genders  (from low  to high-educated people). 
These effects can go in the same way, as in the case of graduate women: 
their NPVR is higher than panel’s NPVR both because they are female and 
because they are graduated. However, these effects could offset each other, 
as in the case of male graduated: because of their sex, they should have a 
NPVR  minor  than  average,  but  because  of  their  education  it  should  be 
higher. The total effect is the sum of these two distinct phenomena.  
                                                 
17 In the simulation presented  the discount rate is fixed at 1.5%. We run our simulation with 
interest rate of zero and 3%. In the former case, NPVR are extremely high, and in the latter 
extremely low but relive differences among educational level do not appear to be influenced 
by the choice of this parameter.    25 
In Graph 6 we break down the total distribution in a part due to sex and 
in a part due to education
18.    
 
Graph 6 
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Black bars refer to total redistribution from social security system: males 
with less than High School are the largest “losers”, having the NPVR 16% 
less than general average. This large difference depends for a 7% by sex 
(white bar) and for a 10%
19 by low education (grey bar). Taking a broader 
view, se see that sex effect stays constant at 7-8%, while education effect 
differs among groups. It matters most for the above cited poorly educated 
males (-10%) and least for females with High School (+1%).  
A  complete  description  of  distribution  of  NPVR,  both  for  men  and 
women, is supported in Graph 7 and Graph 8. 
                                                 
18 Total distribution is obtained as the percentage difference between the individual NPVR 
and  the  panel’s  NPVR.  Distribution  due  to  education  is  obtained  as  the  percentage 
difference  between  the  individual  NPVR  and  the  general  male  and  female  NPVR. 
Difference due sex is obtained by subtraction (total minus education)  
19 Because of rounding, total may not exactly be the sum of sex and education.   26 
Graph 7 
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We  can  see  that  the  paths  of  lines in  Graph  7 and  Graph  8  are  very 
similar to those in Graph 3 and Graph 4 (death age frequency density). This 
appears obvious once equation (1.1) is considered and Graph 5 is looked at. 
As we have found, there is a certain degree of redistribution from low to 
high-educated people. However, since education is positively correlated with 
income,  it  is  likely  that  social  security  system  ends  up  redistributing 
resources from poor to rich.  
In order to measure the potential system progressivity/regressivity of the 
NDC system, we classify individuals with respect to the Average Indexed 
Yearly Earnings
20, defined as lifetime earnings divided by the number of 
years with positive earnings. 
 
Table 10 





Men   Women 
1st  0,843  0,987 
2nd  0,842  1,001 
3rd  0,867  1,015 
4th  0,881  1,004 
5th  0,894  1,028 




Table  10  confirms  a  regressive  redistribution  once  individuals  are 
classified by lifetime income, by means of the positive correlation between 
educational attainment and income. NPVR shows an increasing trend with 
income quintiles: between the 5
th and 1
st quintile there are, for both men and 
women, five points of difference in terms of NPVR. However, these gaps are 
                                                 
20 Average because lifetime wealth is divided by the number of years with positive earnings. 
Wages earned in different periods have been indexed at 1995 values.   28 
smaller than those observed classifying individuals by level of education (see 
Table 9). Even in this case, it is possible to isolate the effect due to sex and 
the one due to wealth, as we show in Graph 9. 
 
Graph 9 
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 Analogously to Graph 6, white bars refer to redistribution due to sex, 
grey due to wealth and black bars represent the total percentage difference 
with respect general NPVR (0,935). The effect due to sex is constant at 7-
8%, just like in Graph 6. We observe that wealth contributes for about 2-3% 
to the total percentage. For instance, poorest males have a NPVR 10% less 
than average: 7 points depends on sex, and 3 on standard of living. On the 
other hand, richest men have their NPVR 4% less than average: in this case 
the positive effect due to income (+3%) partly offsets the negative effect due 
to sex (-8%). 
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Conclusion 
 
This work measured the magnitude the extent of redistribution among 
socioeconomic  groups  under  the  NDC  pension  system,  for  a  panel  of 
individuals born between 1975 and 2000. This redistribution arises because 
of  the  implementation  of  uniform  coefficients  of  transformation,  which 
cannot  take  into  account  the  different  life  expectancy  due  to  factor  like 
gender, education or wealth.  
For this aim we use CAPP_DYN, a dynamic microsimulation model able 
to forecast the long-term redistributive effects of fiscal policies. 
After  having  reviewed  the  most  important  findings  about  the  link 
between  socioeconomic  factors  and  differential  mortality,  and  between 
differential  mortality  and  actuarial  fairness,  we  estimated  mortality  tables 
differentiated by sex and education. For example, we find that the average 
pensioners’ death age was 82,5 years for a man with less than High School 
and 85,9 for a man with a university degree. Similar pattern were observed 
among women. 
We identified at least three channels of redistribution: among genders 
(from men to women), along educational lines (from low to high educated) 
and among income quintiles (from poor to rich). This happens because some 
groups systematically live less than average (men, low-educated and poor) 
while others live more than average (women, high educated and rich). 
For instance, for every euro paid at the social security system, a man can 
expect to receive 86,6 cents back, while a woman receives 100,1 cents back. 
These figures become 78 and 95 cents for respectively low-educated men 
and women, and 90 and 104 cents for graduated men and women. Therefore, 
even within genders, we saw a strong redistribution from individuals with 
less than High School to those with secondary school or more. 
Moreover,  since  education  is  positively  correlated  with  income,  it  is 
likely that social security system ends up redistributing resources from poor 
to rich. In order to measure the potential system progressivity/regressivity, 
we classified individuals with respect the Average Indexed Yearly Earnings, 
defined as lifetime earnings divided by the number of years with positive   30 
earnings.  We  found  the  system  to  be  regressive.  A  men  belonging  to  1
st 
quintile has a NPVR of 0,843, about 2,3 points less than average male NPVR 
(0,866) and 5 point less than the 5
th quintile (0,894). Turning to women, the 
poorest ones have 0,987 while the most affluent people 1,028. 
We  can  conclude  stating  that,  along  with  redistribution  across 
educational lines, we find a regressive transfer, which penalises poor people. 
Of course, this regressivity is unintended and is a necessary by-product of 
using uniform coefficients of transformation, which do not take into account 
sexual or social differences. However this finding is not trivial: even if the 
NDC system assures long run macroeconomic sustainability, it harms the 
most disadvantaged groups like poor and low-educated people. 
   31 
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